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摘  要 
 







    本文通过我国的证券市场实证研究得到结论如下： 






































































    China is a typically transitional economy which has currently been transforming 
from a plan-driven to market-driven model. Though characterized by a poor 
institution, the legal environment in China evolved rapidly in recent years. Due to 
regulation embedded in the traditional culture and history of China, the regulation has 
almost prevailed over other schemes, such as legal governance. Based on the special 
institutional setting of China, we seek to investigate the relationship between 
regulation, external auditing, and rights issues by addressing the following questions. 
Does the regulation of rights issues matter or be effective in the capital allocation in 
the emerging Chinese stock market? Furthermore, how does the toughness of 
regulation of rights issues over time affect the information content of modified audit 
opinions and equity-financing behavior of Chinese listed firms who demand external 
funds? In addition, does big auditor always perform better as an economic agent than 
small auditor in the poor institution setting of China? 
    Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we document some evidences as follows. 
    1. China’s regulation of rights issues was generally effective to guide the flow of 
capital to better performing listed firms during the study period, based on the 
accounting and stock performance after announcement of rights issue proposal 
approved at the board meeting, as well as the direct and indirect effect of the 
regulation. Furthermore, we find the regulation of rights issue was stricter and more 
effective over time. The detail evidences from the tests of direct and indirect effect of 
the regulation are as follows. In the tests of the direct effect of regulation, it is 
significant effectiveness in both of the two different regulation periods in terms of 
accounting performance; however it is significantly effective only in the later 
regulation period in terms of stock performance. In the tests of indirect effect of 
regulation, it is significantly effective only in the later regulation period in terms of 
accounting and stock performance respectively. Interestingly, effectiveness of direct 
effect of the regulation had been significantly improved over time only for the listed 
firms with rights issue proposal denied by China’s regulators while having accounting 
performance increased significantly in the later regulation period, however the 
effectiveness is only supported by tests of accounting performance. 
    2. Under the pressure of improved regulation of rights issues in 2001, the firms 
that wanted to raise equity took self-selection action to avoid the rejection of the 
rights issue proposal by the regulators, and this self-selection led to a significant 
decline in number of firms of which rights issue proposal was rejected by the 
regulators due to receiving modified audit opinions. Furthermore, improved regulation 














opinions of the firms that gained rights issue approval, as afterward that the modified 
audit opinions were not considered any longer by the regulator and modified audit 
opinions no longer affect long-term stock performance. 
    3. Compared to small auditors, big auditors monitor earnings management in the 
rights issuers more effectively, as earnings management is measured by positive 
discretionary accruals and absolute discretionary accruals. This monitoring effect of 
big auditors is significantly stronger for the group with right offerings than that 
without right offerings, because discretionary accruals and positive discretionary 
accruals of rights issuers are significantly higher than those of non-issuers. However, 
the evidence superficially suggests that big auditors don’t constrain earnings 
management of the whole sample firms consisting of both rights issuers and 
non-issuers more effectively than small auditors. 
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第一章 导  论 
 1
第一章 导  论 
    作为开篇之论，本章简要阐述了本文的研究背景和写作动机，提出了研究的
问题并介绍了论文的研究框架与结构安排、学术贡献和创新。 
1.1 研究问题与研究目的 
    近由于美国的次贷危机引发的全球金融危机凸现了金融管制
①
的重要性和





    因此，本文的第一个研究问题是，我国的配股管制在保护投资者利益和优化
资源配置方面是否有效。 
















































    因此，本文的第二个研究问题是，2001 年我国配股管制环境的加强是否会
影响配股申请公司的非标意见信息含量。 








                                                 
① 本文的非标意见是指非标准无保留审计意见（简称非标意见），包括带解释性说明的无保留意
见、保留意见、无法表示意见和否定意见，参见 2001 年证监会《公开发行证券的公司信息披露






















   因此，本文的第三个研究问题是，在新兴资本市场的转型经济中国，大所会
表现出一贯的高质量审计吗。 

















图 1-1 所示。 
     
















图 1-1  研究框架 
 
    全文共分为六章，各章的内容摘要如下： 
    第一章 导论 
    本章主要介绍论文研究的背景和动机、研究的问题、内容安排和研究方法及
主要的学术贡献和创新。 
    第二章 制度背景和理论分析 
    本章主要介绍了我国证券市场的制度背景，对我国证券市场的发展和配股管
制的背景及审计市场的发展进行主要的梳理，并从公司治理理论、管制理论和审
计理论进行分析。 
    第三章 我国配股管制的有效性研究 
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